HUBBARD COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE
Saint Hill Manor, East Grinstead, Sussex
HCO BULLETIN OF 8 MARCH 19621
THE BAD “AUDITOR”
It is time we spent time on improving auditing skill.
We have the technology. We can make clears and OTs with it as you will find out. Our only remaining problem is getting it applied skillfully.
This is why I started the Saint Hill Special Briefing Course. The extremely high caliber of auditor we are turning out is causing gasps of amazement whenever these fine graduates return into an area. We are not trying for cases at Saint Hill. I can always make clears. We are trying for skilled auditors. But we are getting there on cases, too, faster than anywhere else on the average.
This training has been almost a year in progress. I have learned much about training that is of great benefit to all of us, without at the same time skimping the training of the Saint Hill student.
Looking over incoming students I find we have, roughly, two general categories of auditor, with many shades of grey between:
1. The natural auditor.
2. The dangerous auditor.
The natural auditor ties right into it and does a workmanlike job. He or she gets lots of bulletin and tape passes in ratio to flunks, absorbs data well and gets it into practice, does a passable job on a pc even at the start of training, and improves casewise rapidly under the skilled training and auditing at Saint Hill. This is true of the clears and releases that come on course as well as those who have had much less case gains prior to this training. These, the natural auditors, make up more than half the incoming students.
The other category we will call the “dangerous auditor”. The severe examples of this category make up about 20% of the incoming students and are very detectable. In shades of grey the other 30% are also, at the start, to be placed in the category of “dangerous auditor unless tightly supervised”.
At Saint Hill, with few exceptions, we only get the cream of auditors and so I would say that the overall percentage across the world is probably higher in the second category than at Saint Hill.
Thus it would seem we must cure this matter at the Academies and cure it broadly throughout Scientology, and if we do, our dissemination, just on this effort alone, should leap several thousand percent. If all pcs audited everywhere were expertly audited, well, think of what that would do. To accomplish this we need only move the dangerous auditor out of the danger class.
I have found out what makes a pc suffer a deterioration of profile (missed withholds) and have found out why a dangerous auditor is dangerous. Therefore, there are no barriers to our handling the matter as even the dangerous auditor, oddly enough, wants to be a good auditor but doesn’t quite know how. Now we can fix it up.
The difference between a natural auditor and a dangerous auditor is not case level as we have supposed, but a type of case.
The earliest observation on this came in ACCs. About 1% of the students (say two students every ACC) could be counted on to be miserable if his or her pc made gains and happy if the pc was collapsing. This was an observation. What were these students trying to do? What did they think they should accomplish in a session? They are an extreme case of “dangerous auditor”.
This is how to detect a “dangerous auditor” in any shade of gray:
Any auditor who (a) cannot achieve results on a pc, (b) who finds items slowly or not at all, (c) who gets low marks on tape tests, (d) who has a high flunk-to-pass ratio on taking tests for classification, (e) whose own case moves slowly, (f) who does not respond well to a “think” process, (g) who chops a pc’s comm, (h) who prevents a pc from executing an auditing command, (i) who obsessively changes processes before one is flat, (j) who apologizes or explains why he or she got no results session after session, (k) who tries to make pcs guilty, (I) who blames Scientology for not working, (m) whose pcs are always ARC breaking, or (n) who will no longer audit at all, is suffering not from withholds but from the reverse of the withhold flow, “Afraid to find out”.
The person with withholds is afraid he or she will be found out. The other type of case may have withholds but the dominant block is exactly the reverse. Instead of being afraid he or she will be found out, the opposite type of case is afraid to find out or afraid of what he or she may find out. Thus it is a type of case that makes a dangerous auditor. He or she is afraid of finding out something from the pc. Probably this case is the more usual in society, particularly those who never wish to audit. A person with withholds is afraid to be found out. Such a person has auditing difficulties as an auditor, of course, because of restraint on their own comm line. These difficulties sum up to an inability to speak during a session, going silent on the pc,
failures to ask how or what the pc is doing. But this is not the dangerous auditor. The only dangerous thing an auditor can do is miss withholds and refuse to permit the pc to execute auditing commands. This alone will spin2 a pc.
The dangerous auditor is not afraid to be found out (for who is questioning him or her while he or she is auditing?). The dangerous auditor is the auditor who is afraid to find out, afraid to be startled, afraid to discover something, afraid of what they will discover. This phobia prevents the “auditor” from flattening anything. This makes missed withholds a certainty. And only missed withholds create ARC breaks.
All cases, of course, are somewhat leery of finding things out and so any old-time auditor could have his quota of ARC breaks on his or her pcs. But the dangerous auditor is neurotic on the subject and all his or her auditing is oriented around the necessity to avoid data for fear of discovering something unpleasant. As auditing is based on finding data, such an auditor retrogresses a case rather than improves it. Such an auditor’s own case moves slowly also as they fear to discover something unpleasant or frightening in the bank.
Today, the increased power of auditing makes this factor far more important than it ever was before. Old processes could be done with minimal gain but without harm by such an auditor. Today, the factor of fear-of-discovery in an auditor makes that auditor extremely dangerous to a pc.
In Prepchecking3, this becomes obvious when an auditor will not actually clean up a chain and skids over withholds, thus “completing” the case by leaving dozens of missed withholds and an accordingly miserable pc.
In Routine 3D Criss Cross4 this becomes obvious when the auditor takes days and weeks to find an item, then finds one that won’t check out. An item every three sessions of two hours each is a low average for 3D Criss Cross. An item a week is suspect. An item a month is obviously the average of an auditor who will not find out and is dangerous. The auditor who uses out-rudiments always to avoid doing 3D Criss Cross is a flagrant example of a no-discovery-please auditor.
In the CCHs5, the dangerous auditor is narrowed down to prevention of executing the auditing command. This, indeed, is the only way an auditor can make the CCHs
fail. In any of the CCHs, the commands and drills are so obvious that only the prevention of execution can accomplish not-finding-out. The dangerous auditor is never satisfied the pc has executed the command. Such an auditor can be seen to move the pc’s hand on the wall after the pc has in fact touched the wall. Or the pc is made to do a motion over and over which is already well done. Or the pc is run only on processes that are flat and is halted on processes that are still changing.
The pc is never permitted to reveal anything by the dangerous auditor. And so “auditing” fails.
The remedies for the dangerous auditor, by class of process, are:
Class I—Repetitive Process, run in sequence
REVELATION PROCESS X1
What could you confront?
What would you permit another to reveal?
What might another confront?
What might another permit you to reveal?
What would you rather not confront?
What would you rather not have another reveal?
What might another hate to confront?
What might another object to your revealing?
What should be confronted?
What shouldn’t anyone ever have to confront?
(Note: This process is subject to refinement and other processes on the same subject will be released.)
Class II—Prepchecking Zero Question
Have you ever prevented another from perceiving something?
(Other such Zero Questions are possible on the theme of fear-of-discovery.)
CCHs should be used if tone arm action during any Prepchecking is less than 3/4 of a division shift per hour.
Class III—Routine 3D Criss Cross
Find Line Items as follows:
Who or What would be afraid to find out? (then get oppterm6 of resulting item)
Who or What would prevent a discovery? (then oppterm it)
Who or What would startle someone? (then oppterm it)
Who or What would be unsafe for you to reveal? (then oppterm it)
Who or What would be dangerous for another to reveal? (then oppterm it)
Note: Well run CCHs, run according to the very earliest data on them, given again on two Saint Hill Briefing Course Tapes (R-10/6106C22SH/Spec 18, “Running CCHs” and R-12/6106C27SH/Spec 21, “CCHs—Circuits”), benefit any case and are not relegated to the psychotic by a long ways. The CCHs do a remarkable job in making a good auditor for various reasons. The first CCH (Op Pro by Dup) was invented exclusively to make good auditors. The CCHs 1 to 4 are run each one in turn, only so long as they produce change and no longer, before going on to the next. When is a CCH flat so that one can go on to the next CCH? When three complete cycles of the CCH have a uniform comm lag it can be left. My advice in straightening out or improving any auditor is to first flatten the CCHs 1 to 4, and then flattening all in one run Op Pro by Dup. This would be regardless of the length of time the auditor had been auditing in Dianetics and Scientology. Then I would do the Class II and Class III processes above, preferably doing the Class III items first, then the Class II so it could go whole track, or doing the Class II, then the Class III and then the Class II again.
Following out any part of this program in any organization, in the field and on any training course will vastly improve the results of auditing and enormously diminish auditing failures.
L. RON HUBBARD
Hubbard, L. R. (1962, 8 February). HCOB: The Bad “Auditor”. Technical Bulletins of Dianetics and Scientology (1991 ed., Vol. VI. p. 452-455). Los Angeles: Bridge Publications, Inc.
- Document studied on the Hubbard Senior Security Checker Course. ↩
- Definition: spinning ↩
- Definition: Prepchecking ↩
- Definition: Routine 3D Criss Cross ↩
- Definition: CCHs ↩
- Definition: Opposition Terminal ↩
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