OFFICE OF SPECIAL AFFAIRS
16 June 1988
OSA Network Order No. 441
INTELLIGENCE, ITS ROLE
(Originally written by LRH on 8 June 1973.)
The roles of Intelligence are PREDICTION and SUPPORT.
The first function of Intelligence is providing planning, command and policymaking with ESTIMATIONS OF THE COURSE OF FUTURE EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE GENERAL ACTIVITY.
The methods of Intelligence in accomplishing this are many. The most precious and infinitely valued characteristic in an Intelligence post is “FLAIR,” “a keen natural discernment; an aptitude, a knack.” This is so rare that in governments and armies there may be only one such person in a whole generation or even in two or three generations, so do not underestimate the skill or value of the characteristic. IT CAN BE DEVELOPED and assumed if one realizes it is possible to achieve.
The most esoteric of the arcane arts have been, at one time or another, part and parcel of the contemporary Intelligence establishment. The divination of the Greeks, the very oracle at Delphi, the augury of the Romans, the visions of Joan of Arc, the astrologers serving rulers and the fortune tellers advising stock brokers on Wall Street all must be included under the heading of Intelligence establishment, since, by whatever processes or lines of information, inspired, divined from the gods or picked up in the gutters of owned or enemy towns, all have led to AN ESTIMATE OF A GIVEN SITUATION BASED ON AVAILABLE OR PROCURED OR SURMISED INFORMATION THAT WILL FORM A NEEDED PREDICTION VITAL TO THE PROCESS OF PLANNING, COMMAND AND EXECUTION IN MATTERS OF INDIVIDUAL, CORPORATE OR STATE CONCERN.
The normal process of Intelligence is to procure by numerous and varied and always changing means or to use accumulated stores of DATA on a given subject (called RAW data), add to it the data of the requiring organization, process and coordinate the whole, add flair, and furnish a prediction which tells whether or not there is a situation, its benefit or danger, its extent and priority of attention, for the use of planning, command and policy and including in its submission all data used (within the limits of propriety and security). This is called an ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.
This ESTIMATE must be in such a form as to be of use, and have factual proof, unaltered, unperverted, as to the existence or non-existence of the SITUATION and its possible CONSEQUENCES or lack of them for the ESTABLISHMENT or the persons being served.
Data, properly belonging to Intelligence, often enters the establishment on different routes, sent to executives or others not concerned with Intelligence. That Intelligence is not aware of it is a failure since it is a necessary part of all pre-estimations that the establishment data be added to the data body under Intelligence study. This internal escapement alone can cause an Intelligence failure since it then does not know the course and direction of activities under consideration and does not understand the value or priority of its own activities. As an example, an Intelligence unit expending vast effort on a project that is no longer of interest to command and policy-makers who have already taken another direction, is an Intelligence unit that will not have the attention or resources to serve the true involvements of the establishment. CIA, carrying out its own wars, SIS (UK) serving the government opposition instead of the government itself and bringing off WW II, these are only two of the many examples of an Intelligence unit failing to add to its estimates the data of the establishment it serves and creating chaos.
This escapement of information from its proper lines or its failure to reach or be regarded or used by Intelligence individuates the Intelligence unit and makes it useless or even harmful. An Intelligence unit is always part of the MAIN TEAM. The often secret nature of its work tends to trend it toward autonomy and a divided separateness that renders it either apathetic or individually ambitious.
An Intelligence unit that imperfectly understands its function will omit to do a proper ESTIMATE but will feed raw or fragmentary data to planning, command and policy-makers and will cause them to be alarmed or overly confident and in any event will cause them to make mistakes or even fail.
When a SITUATION arrives unheralded by Intelligence into the hands of command, Intelligence has miserably failed. Regardless of the kind or type of situation, that it was not predicted by Intelligence is an emphatic Intelligence failure. An example in war would be an unlooked for attack for which no defense had been prepared (like Pearl Harbor). A corporate example would be a suit filed in a court and served on the corporation without a much earlier PREDICTION by Intelligence, given in good time to avert the whole suit.
ANY SITUATION WHICH COMES AS A SURPRISE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OR ANY PART OF IT IS AN INTELLIGENCE FAILURE.
FLAIR in any degree is assiduously applied as a personal attribute by every Intelligence person for it tells him where to direct his questioning and his attention or his choice of subjects or areas. FLAIR is practiced by every Intelligence executive for it tells him where to direct his operatives, where to look for information and what to prepare to estimate and if his estimates when done are correct.
An Intelligence unit, when it exceeds a reasonable size, begins to swell in demands of finance and numbers to the degree that its personnel LACK flair. There is even an Intelligence organization system that assumes that when it does not have FLAIR in its personnel, you must make up for it with voluminous numbers and expenses. Yet, most establishments demand a cold-blooded, authoritative, factual, over-proven SITUATION to exist before they will pay attention to Intelligence’s “belief ” that something should be looked into and tell it to collect or accumulate or assemble data and offer an ESTIMATE. Thus these establishments are running on a repair-of-the-already-occurred-catastrophe basis. They have therefore lost sight of the possibility of PREDICTION, and what is actually an Intelligence message is arriving at top echelon as RAW DATA and without an ESTIMATE and even without enough
RAW DATA to make an estimate.
Intelligence is usually looked upon as an establishment’s EYES. Actually this is a shortsighted mistake. Intelligence might better be considered “eyesight and foresight.” A much better symbol for Intelligence would be AN EYE IN A CRYSTAL BALL.
But we do not need diviners, augurers, visionaries, astrologers or fortune tellers. We have our own brand of PREDICTION TECHNOLOGY and it has very little to do with the arcane arts. Although our Intelligence tech might seem like black magic to those in primitive services, it consists of:
Knowing we are beings in the first place (as different than cogs or MEST).
Knowing the mental processes (and therefore the meaning of behavior) of persons or other activities.
Being less aberrated and fixated ourselves (and therefore more able to direct our own attention or that of others and less apt to ride pet targets and be blind to others that may exist).
Having a more honorable and honest purpose and goal (with less liability in the commission of overts) for man.
Having been shaped up by the most severe and unreasonable adversaries on many continents, limited in resources, unable to call on governmental or state powers when in the lurch, and therefore possessing through purest necessity, superior—infinitely superior—technology for Intelligence work.
Having a superior organizational pattern born out of necessity and lack of resources.
Having all the OLD Intelligence technology in addition to our own, the fruit of thirty-three centuries of known Intelligence experience.
Having the technology of study in which to master our own and older technologies.
Having had awe-inspiring wins against the most formidable odds and even against the “greatest” existing Intelligence services.
Considering Intelligence and data as a necessity in all our organizational commands.
And: Possessing above Intelligence estimates the technology of EVALUATION with which to use those estimates to total advantage.
AND WE ARE, THEREFORE, WHILE BEING TOTALLY PRACTICAL, AND WITHOUT USING ANY ACTUAL ARCANE PROCESSES, POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL BEYOND THE GREATEST DREAMS AND ASPIRATIONS OF ANY FORMER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THIS UNIVERSE BAR NONE.
Now if you grasp that, you will grasp Intelligence beingness and purpose. And having grasped it, being a being and being YOU, you can BE the beingness and do the doingness necessary to fulfill the most extreme needs required by command and policy-making levels. Just decide to be it and be it, then you can know it and then do it and you will have it.
It is NOT supernatural.
It is merely superhuman.
The way to begin to be an Intelligence unit member is simply to BE an Intelligence personnel of whatever classification: executive, operative, communicator, estimator, administrative, clerical or any other type of post you will be holding in Intelligence. THEN study the materials from the viewpoint that you ARE that beingness and will NEED the technology in that certain way from that viewpoint. This makes one a VERY fast study. One isn’t a student “becoming something someday.” One IS. When one IS he can sort out the value of different data and subjects because they are what he NEEDS and needs NOW. Then one continues to work at his post. Soon he will find that certain things he dimly passed over seem to be assuming more value. By a re-study things fall into line even better. He becomes smoother. Now he may find that he also needs to know something of the whole group organization of
which Intelligence is a part. And one studies that from his beingness in Intelligence. And so with experience and re-studies one becomes a BETTER Intelligence personnel. Then one perhaps studies mental tech.
Gradually one is freed from the various mysteries of the craft and one finds he can observe better and that he gets more out of an existing scene perusal in his daily activity AS an Intelligence personnel.
At the same time his case is probably improving.
At the same time he is gathering up wins and verve.
And suddenly he finds he has FLAIR!
For what is flair? It is “a keen natural discernment.” It’s an “aptitude,” a “knack.” And what can one now do? From his own beingness, he has an ability to pick things out of the field or materials or scene beheld from his own viewpoint. Because he is viewing with a specific purpose and because one now has the technology and experience to know what will be useful, he finds he can choose what to view and know what he is viewing with a speed which would be dizzying in any other service. And when he adds all that up to what he knows of the needs and circumstances and daily condition of the broader group of which his Intelligence unit is a part, he can make ESTIMATES with a speed and accuracy that give every sign of supernatural agencies at work to anyone not so “gifted” with his beingness, training and experience. Knowing the Tone Scale2 better than he knows his own palm, knowing the usual in the organizational or social scene, being able as a being to PERMEATE the group or individuals being viewed, directly or through reports, one is at once AWARE of a potential SITUATION days, weeks, a year before it will ever happen.
One can then collect, in numerous ways, many peculiar to the craft, the exact data needed to form a CONCLUSION that there is or is not a situation. And either way, one can then make a PREDICTION, backed up with the RAW DATA and its summary into a SITUATION or a NO-SITUATION which will be of great positive value to planners, command and policy-makers.
With that fundamental structure handled by an extremely capable Intelligence unit, the next step, actually above the requirements of a prediction, can be done. This upper step is called EVALUATION. It is a solid brand new technology. It is contained in the DATA SERIES. It is a high skill. An EVALUATOR takes very hard training and lots of practice and a purity of view that has not previously existed. At this writing it is doubtful if there are half a dozen truly skilled evaluators on the planet. There are a few hundred who know of the system and can use it to some degree. There are a few thousand who know the title of it and use some of its words loosely. More are being made. For the direct observed results in using the system are incredibly improved over and above any past effort to resolve organizational, social or any other type of problem. A good EVALUATION is the difference between victory and defeat.
A good EVALUATION gives the magic key to open the road to betterment in any endeavor. From it alone comes the diamond valued program which, done step by step, will take one forward to certain result.
While EVALUATION is as yet so little known that it can be looked on by the uninitiated as just another program, or something you write up because “you know the WHY” of the situation, respect is growing as evidence of its magic increases and awe has begun to appear here and there where black night was turned to broadest day. So where there were half a dozen, there will be many dozen.
And any planner, command or policy-making personnel who cannot use the DATA SERIES are very likely to fail in this organization.
And all this is very pertinent to Intelligence. And this to some degree heightens the necessity and value of good Intelligence beyond any level it has ever held. For: INTELLIGENCE FURNISHES MUCH OF THE DATA ON WHICH EVALUATION IS BASED. AND INTELLIGENCE SHOULD FURNISH THE SITUATIONS, THE PREDICTIONS, WHICH TELL WHETHER AN EVALUATION SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE DONE!
The state of an org, the rumors at the courthouse, the visit of a government inspector, a report of a scream for lots of refunds, the threats of an expulsion recipient, the glee on the faces of students, these and thousands more, all serve as indicators that point to a possible need of defensive Intelligence: the view of the scene, the gathering of raw data, the requirements of the policy-makers known and compared, the processing of the data (getting it co-coordinated and sorted out), the statement of the SITUATION or NO-SITUATION with the PREDICTION of what may or may not occur, the submission of the packet to planning or command for an EVALUATION to be evaluated or not in order to find the WHY and get a proper PROGRAM, would round out defensive Intelligence.
What could be called SUPPORT Intelligence (or attack or offensive Intelligence) is the other side of the coin and also forms a vital part of Intelligence activities. But here Intelligence is carrying out part of a program furnished by evaluation to command and ordered executed.
In such a program, Intelligence may have its part as one or more targets. These might be “12. Obtain copies of the documents from the courthouse that show that Wm. Syckes of 643 Iron Ave., Toolesville, born 19 August 1921, was committed to Delaware Insane Asylum in 1964.” Or “Target 5. Procure the name of the owner of the Ford with license number Vermont 639-432.” Or “Tgt 7. Interview Mrs. Bates of 42 Palm Drive Suburbia and find out her motives for demanding that her son remain on drugs.” A large number of such targets will be for the assistance of Legal with which Intelligence often works so as to back up their cases. But some will be for command who is trying to find out if there is something there to evaluate.
The variety of SUPPORT Intelligence is very great. It usually exists to back up a program already in progress. But it can also directly engage in the location of a possible situation so that an offensive can be mounted; this does not constitute a defensive action as it is still directed at areas of potential hostility outside the organization where a threat has been demonstrated.
“Who exactly is shooting at us?” is a question SUPPORT Intelligence has to answer again and again as different situations suddenly reveal themselves. This can become “Why are they shooting at us?” And it can become, “Is he still shooting at us?” All defensive and support Intelligence is done in a way that brings no liability to the organization. When Intelligence is clumsy and short cuts its actions by illegal means or violence in any service, it can have a Watergate. There is no need for this sort of thing actually. A “suitable guise” on the other hand is not illegal. Papers secured in a legal manner can be presented in courts and used whereas covertly obtained materials are sometimes useless because one cannot refer to them and they would serve at best only as a guide as to where to look legally for documents one CAN use, so why not have enough flair to know where to look for papers that can be legally used?
Thus to PREDICTION can be added SUPPORT in handling what has been PREDICTED and EVALUATED.
An Intelligence unit, then, is the beginning and part of the end of all SITUATIONS. Normally it is divided into two parts, one which is defensive, the other which is supportive (or attack).
Since the word “Intelligence” is too revelatory on door plate and personnel rosters, it has become customary in the last decade or two to give its activities the title of “Information” department or service, a euphemism (using a gentler name). But if in doing so, its own personnel become drowsy or think they are really public relations people, the re-titling has gone too far.
In all the texts that cover the activities of historical intelligence or its technology, it is bluntly INTELLIGENCE. So that is the subject title when one is studying it.
Calling it the “Information Department” must only be regarded as itself, “a suitable guise.” One can call herself “the Information File Clerk” and have that on her personnel record and tell it to her friends; but in actual fact she is the “Intelligence File Clerk” and by putting names into folders and cross indexing names she is putting her delicate and well manicured finger on Mr. Mugg and Mrs. Badcat day after day as surely as James Bond ever pointed the small but deadly muzzle of his Walther pistol. And the Handler of Operatives in NE America may well call himself “NE Information Director,” he is still handling operatives who “in suitable guise” are getting the data for defense or support that will PREDICT and help to end some things that would be very, very rough indeed were they to get out of hand. So they are still Intelligence personnel. So even their beingness has “a suitable guise,” a fact which must never obscure their ability to attain FLAIR. And use it.
History has made many astonishing revelations as to who were Intelligence operatives or personnel: Daniel Defoe, Christopher Morley, many others of the past. And Ian Fleming was a very good Intelligence planner in WW II before he thought of writing James Bond. The list is studded with famous names. And the location of the place (hitherto unsuspected) where the Nazis were building rockets and working on their own A-Bomb—PEENEMUNDE—was located by a not so lowly Photograph File Clerk who herself had a share of flair.
And so it can’t be quite as lowly an activity as some people try to make out. And as to its use, behind every great battle win, every successful handling of a crisis in empire, there was Intelligence, doing a splendid job. It is remarkable that school histories and the public are not aware of these. You have to be an Intelligence person to look them up and understand them and how important they were. To the public then, it is a SILENT service, a part of the scene that isn’t there, maybe like a thetan looking on above the crowd.
But to the planners, command and policy-makers of an organization it is not silent. The very safety and continuance of the whole organized body daily depends upon its Intelligence people, their flair, their investigation, their raw data, their estimate and their prediction and, in the end of it, their support in making defense and attack possible, purposeful and effective.
And our Intelligence has the added bonus that what it is doing for the organization, it is doing for the world and therefore for themselves as well.
L. RON HUBBARD